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Bertero v. National General Corp.: Drawing
the Line Between an Aggressive Defense
and Malicious Prosecution
By MARC A. LEVINSON*
Introduction
The California Supreme Court has long recognized that a person who
maliciously and without probable cause initiates and prosecutes a civil
action will be liable in a subsequent lawsuit for the damages suffered by the
defendant. I Thus, while a successful defendant is not always made whole
under California law, the same party in a suit brought maliciously and
without probable cause is at the very least compensated for any monetary
losses incurred in defending the suit. The court's rationale for the recogni-
tion of this tort has been explained as follows:
[W]hen the action is brought and prosecuted maliciously, and with-
out reasonable or probable cause, the plaintiff asserts no claim in
respect to which he had any right to invoke the aid of the law. In
such cases the plaintiff, by an abuse of legal process, unjustly
subjects the defendant to damages which are not fully compen-
sated by the costs he recovers. The plaintiff, in such case, has no
legal or equitable right to claim that the rule of law which allows a
suit to be brought and prosecuted in good faith without liability of
the plaintiff to pay the defendant damages, except by way and to
the extent of the taxable costs, if judgment be rendered in his
favor, should extend to a case where the suit was maliciously
prosecuted without probable cause. But where the damages sus-
tained by the defendant in defending a suit maliciously prosecuted
without reasonable or probable cause, exceed the costs obtained by
him, he has, and of right should have, a remedy by action on the
case.
2
* B.A., 1970, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1973, University of.Califor-
nia, Davis; member, California bar. Law Clerk to Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, 1973-1974.
I. See, e.g., Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644 (1866).
2. Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 127,4 P. 1106, 1109 (1884) (quoting Closson v.
Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 220-21 (1869)).
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In addition to making the original defendant whole, the legal system now
permits punitive damage awards against persons who bring and prosecute
malicious actions.'
Conversely, the law has historically sanctioned the pursuit of an ag-
gressive defense to insure that the plaintiff proves his case. This attitude
stems in part from the fact that the defendant does not invoke the protection
of the judicial system; he most often comes before the court involuntarily. In
the first California case to reject the restrictive English rule of civil mali-
cious prosecution, Eastin v. Bank of Stockton,4 the court actually denied the
existence of a tort of malicious defense. In so doing, the court distinguished
between the initiation and the defense of a civil action:
The. plaintiff sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and
maliciously, he is the cause of the defendant's damage. But the
defendant stands only on his legal rights-the plaintiff having taken
his case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling upon
him to prove it to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, and he is
guilty of no wrong in exercising this privilege.5
In Bertero v. National General Corp. ,6 the California Supreme Court
was forced to decide whether an action for malicious prosecution could be
maintained against the defendants of a prior lawsuit on the basis of their
affirmative cross-pleading in that action, which was based on substantially
the same grounds as their previously alleged defenses. The trial court had
held that in maintaining the cross-action, the defendants had moved from
defense to offense7 and, as a result, had damaged plaintiff in the amount of
$1,178,952.77.1 After carefully weighing the precedents and policies in this
area of the law, an unanimous court affirmed the trial court's holding in an
opinion by Chief Justice Donald R. Wright. Although the Bertero opinion
explored an array of related questions, including the definitions of probable
cause 9 and malice1" and the methods for calculating compensatory and
punitive damages,I1 this commentary will primarily explore the relationship
3. California Civil Code § 3294 was enacted in 1872 and amended in 1905 to provide for
punitive damages in non-contract cases when the defendant is guilty of express or implied
malice. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). See, e.g., Thompson v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402,271
P. 198 (1928).
4. 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884). The English rule required that the previous civil proceed-
ing include an attachment, seizure of property or the issuance of process, in addition to the
summons. Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 901, 913 (1975).
5. 66 Cal. at 127, 4 P. at 1109-10. See also Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N.E.2d 41
(1943).
6. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974).
7. Id. at 53, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
8. Id. at 48, 529 P.2d at 612, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
9. Id. at 55, 529 P.2d at 617, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
10. Id. at 65-66, 529 P.2d at 624-25, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
11. Id. at 59-66, 529 P.2d at 620-25, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 196-201.
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between the early denial of the tort of malicious defense and Bertero's
recognition of a cause of action based on the malicious prosecution of a
cross-action. 1
2
I. Facts of the Bertero Case
Plaintiff John Bertero was the president of defendant National General
Corporation. He resigned that post in 1959 following an internal power
struggle, but retained his seat on the board of directors, his previously
awarded stock options, and his life and health insurance benefits. Simul-
taneously, he exchanged his extant employment contract for a new ten-year
agreement. The predecessor in interest of defendant NGC Theatre Corpo-
ration guaranteed Bertero's new employment contract.
Bertero's relationship with defendant Eugene Klein, National's new
president, was less than cordial. In 1962, following Bertero's refusal to
surrender certain stock options and to sell the remainder of his employment
contract, Klein, acting on behalf of the other defendants, sent a letter to
Bertero terminating the latter's salary, stock options, and perquisites. Ber-
tero sued. After an unsuccessful hearing in the Court of Appeal on an
arbitration question, 13 defendants filed their answer alleging that Bertero
obtained the employment contract through duress and through undue influ-
ence on the board of directors, and that the employment contract was
without consideration. Shortly thereafter, defendants filed an amended an-
swer together with a cross-pleading that prayed for the return of over
$100,000 of salary already paid Bertero under the employment contract.
The material allegations of the cross-pleading mirrored the affirmative
defenses set forth in the defendants' answer to the original complaint.
Bertero eventually recovered in excess of $650,000 on his complaint; the
cross-pleading was dismissed with prejudice. 14
Bertero then filed a new action alleging various theories of malicious
prosecution, but the case went to the jury solely on the cause of action
stemming from the alleged malicious prosecution of the cross-pleading.
12. Bertero has often been cited for other propositions including its reaffirmance of the
well-settled rule that all presumptions favor the judgment and that courts must uphold damage
awards wherever possible. See, e.g., Merlo v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App.
3d 5, 17, 130 Cal. Rptr. 416,424 (1976); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d
917, 950, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 493 (1975). The case is also relied upon for its holding that the
defendant's wealth is a factor to be considered in the assessment of punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 496, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140 (1976);
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 937 n.5, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 89 n.5 (1975).
13. Bertero v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 2d 213, 30 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1963).
14. Bertero v. National General Corp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 126, 62 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1967).
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Defendants failed to present any evidence, 15 possibly assuming that no jury
would further compensate a litigant who had recently been awarded
$650,000. Nevertheless, Bertero secured a verdict of approximately $1.2
million, over half of which was punitive damages.
On appeal, defendants asserted that under the Eastin ruling, their
affirmative defenses could not render them liable; consequently, the repeti-
tion of identical allegations in a short cross-pleading could not subject them
to tort liability. The issue was one of first impression in California and had
been previously discussed in only one other reported decision. 16 Chief
Justice Wright attacked the troublesome issue presented in Bertero with a
logical and incisive analysis.
H. Chief Justice Wright's Analysis
The Chief Justice began his analysis with an enumeration of the
elements of the tort of malicious prosecution:
To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution of
a civil proceeding, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior
action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant
and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff's, favor
: . . ; (2) was brought without probable cause. . . ; and (3) was
initiated with malice .... 17
After identifying the three elements, Chief Justice Wright considered
whether the policies underlying this cause of action militated against the
recognition of a cross-pleading as a basis for liability. He viewed the
malicious prosecution of a civil action as a wrong against the individual, the
judiciary, and society as a whole:
The malicious commencement of a civil proceeding is actionable
because it harms the individual against whom the claim is made,
and also because it threatens the efficient administration of justice.
The individual is harmed because he is compelled to defend against
a fabricated claim which not only subjects him to the panoply of
psychological pressures most civil defendants suffer, but also to
the additional stress of attempting to resist a suit commenced out of
spite or ill will, often magnified by slanderous allegations in the
pleadings. The judicial process is adversely affected by a mali-
ciously prosecuted cause not only by the clogging of already
15. Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 59,529 P.2d 608,620, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184, 196 (1974).
16. Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932); see Annot., 85 A.L.R. 412 (1932).
Slee held that a cross-pleading that had been filed without probable cause could serve to subject
a party to liability for malicious prosecution. Slee is discussed in a footnote to the opinion in
Bertero. 13 Cal. 3d at 52 n.3, 529 P.2d at 615 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191 n.3.
17. 13 Cal. 3d at 50, 529 P.2d at 613-14, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90 (citations omitted). This
statement of the elements is now standard. See, e.g., Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v.
Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 682, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291, 296 (1975); 4 WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS §§ 255, 256A (8th ed. Supp. 1976).
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crowded dockets, but by the unscrupulous use of the courts by
individuals ". . . as instruments with which to maliciously injure
their fellow men." (citation omitted).' 8
He questioned whether the harm resulting from a maliciously prosecuted
cross-pleading differed from that caused by the traditional maliciously
prosecuted complaint. He found no compelling differences:
The harm to society and to the individual cross-defendant caused
by the filing of a cross-pleading without probable cause and with
malice is substantially similar to that occasioned by the filing of a
complaint or other initial pleading known to be false or meritless.
The malicious cross-plaintiff, like the malicious plaintiff, uses the
judicial process as a vehicle for harassing or vexing his adversary
or as a means of coercing the settlement of a collateral matter. The
cross-defendant, like the defendant in an original cause maliciously
prosecuted, is compelled to expend attorney's fees in defending
against the false charge and may suffer the same mental or emo-
tional distress and possible loss of reputation and standing in the
community. 19
Finding no justification in social policy arguments for rejecting Ber-
tero's complaint, the Chief Justice then directed his inquiry to the question
of whether a cross-complaint seeking affirmative relief constituted com-
mencement of an action independent of the original complaint. In light of
previous holdings that cross-complaints were distinct and independent
causes of action that were not extinguished by dismissal of the original
complaint, the Chief Justice rejected defendants' contentions that a cross-
complaint did not initiate a judicial proceeding.20 He also noted that this
position had been codified in 1971.21
Defendants had contended that the cross-pleading was a transactional
counterclaim they were obligated to assert under penalty of waiver. They
argued that if the jury in the first action had agreed with the defendants'
18. 13 Cal. 3d at 50-51, 529 P.2d at 614, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
19. Id. at 51, 529 P.2d at 614, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
20. The court stated: "In Skaff v. Small Claims Court (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 76 [65 Cal. Rptr.
65, 435 P.2d 825], we acknowledged that the filing of a counter-claim instituted a'. . separate,
simultaneous action' and reasoned that for purposes of the cross-action, the cross-defendant
was a defendant, noting: '[i]n analyzing counterclaims and cross-complaints, this court has
recognized that "these cross-actions ... are still distinct and independent causes of action, so
that when properly interposed and stated the defendant becomes in respect to the matters
pleaded by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same
parties wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant." (Pacific Finance
Corp. v. Superior Court (1933) 219 Cal. 179, 182 .... )' (Id., at pp. 78-79; see also Case v.
Kadota Fig Assn. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 596, 603 [220 P.2d 912].) In other instances case and
statutory law recognize that a cross-pleading creates an action distinct and separate from an
initial pleading. Dismissal of the complaint, for instance, does not affect the independent
existence of the cross-complaint or counterclaim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. 5; Tomales
Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 389, 395 [217 P.2d 968].)" 13 Cal. 3d at 51-52,
529 P.2d at 614-15, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 52 n.2, 529 P.2d at 615 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191 n.2
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affirmative defenses, they would have found that Bertero secured his em-
ployment contract improperly. Armed with that finding, defendants would
have attempted to recover monies already paid under the employment
agreement. A suit to recover these monies would have constituted a transac-
tional counterclaim that would have been barred because it was not raised in
the first action. The defendants argued they were thus compelled to file the
cross-action. Chief Justice Wright was unimpressed with this sophism,
recognizing that there was no probable cause either for the affirmative
defenses or for the cross-action: "A litigant is never compelled to file a
malicious and fabricated action. It is not the assertion of a claim that is
actionable but rather the malicious character of the assertion. "22
The claim of the defendants that their cross-pleading was merely
defensive and that a penalty should not be imposed for aggressively defend-
ing against the charges asserted in the complaint was also rejected. Finding
that the affirmative relief sought was more than an attempt to repel Bertero's
attack, the Chief Justice concluded that they were in fact attempting to
prosecute a cause of action of their own. They had shifted from the
defensive to the offensive. Thus, the situation differed fundamentally from
that in which a defendant was involuntarily brought into court and then
conducted a vigorous defense. Because of this fundamental difference,
Chief Justice Wright concluded that Bertero's action was not inconsistent
with the line of California cases that had thus far refused to recognize a tort
of malicious defense. Where affirmative relief is "prompted by malice and
is not based on probable cause, it is actionable as in the case of other
affirmative, malicious prosecutions." 23
Defendants also sought refuge in the fact that several cases had held
that malicious prosecution was not a tort favored by the law. 24 Unmoved by
labels, Chief Justice Wright opined that public policy does not and should
not sanction the abuse of the judicial process. In any event, the disfavored
action concept had its origin in public policy pertaining to the enforcement
of criminal laws. 25
Having discerned no policy or precedential reasons for barring redress
to victims of maliciously prosecuted cross-actions, the Chief Justice turned
to the question of the proper measure of damages for the malicious prosecu-
tion of a cross-complaint. The precise issue facing the court in Bertero was
whether the plaintiff or the defendant should have the burden of apportion-
ing damages between the harm that flowed from the proceedings on the
22. Id. at 52, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 53, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 53, 529 P.2d at 615-16, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92.
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cross-action and the harm that flowed from the proceedings on the affirma-
tive defenses. The facts of Bertero confused this issue further because the
affirmative defenses raised by defendants charged Bertero with indiscretions
identical to those alleged in the cross-pleading. Characteristically, Chief
Justice Wright met the problem directly by expressly delineating the dilem-
ma before the court:
The cross-action maliciously pursued, was premised upon the same
theories as was a privileged affirmative defense, and common
factual and legal matters were asserted and urged in support of
each pleading. . . .It was thus difficult if not impossible to appor-
tion the harm which flowed from proceedings had on the cross-
action from that which flowed from those had on the affirmative
defense. 6
In allocating the formidable burden of proving the apportionment of
damage suffered, Chief Justice Wright looked to two analogous precedents,
Summers v. Tice2 7 and Singleton v. Perry.28 In Summers, three hunters
were stalking quail some distance apart from one another. Simultaneously,
both defendants negligently shot and injured the plaintiff. It was impossible
to determine which of the defendants had actually wounded the plaintiff,
and the court concluded that as between plaintiff and defendants, the burden
should, as a matter of policy, fall on the tortfeasors.
Singleton was a logical extension of the reasoning in Summers. In that
case, the plaintiff was arrested in Ohio and returned to California on the
strength of criminal complaints sworn by the defendant. After all criminal
charges were dismissed prior to trial, the plaintiff brought two malicious
prosecution actions. Plaintiff prevailed in one suit and lost in the other;
defendant appealed from the adverse judgment, at which time the issue of
apportioning damages was raised. The Singleton court placed the burden on
the defendant, reasoning that the intentional tortfeasor rather than the victim
should suffer. 29
As in Singleton, the tort in Bertero was willful, and the court placed
the burden of allocation on defendants, remarking that the alternative would
be unconscionable: "To place the burden on the injured party rather than
upon the wrongdoer would, in effect, clothe the transgressor with immunity
26. Id. at 60, 529 P.2d at 620, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (citation omitted).
27. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); see Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 91 (1948).
28. 45 Cal. 2d 489, 289 P.2d 794 (1955).
29. Id. at 498, 289 P.2d at 800. In analyzing the Singleton case in Bertero, Chief Justice
Wright also quoted from an analogous decision of the Missouri Supreme Court:" '... it would
seem almost a mockery to hold that, by uniting groundless accusations with those for which
probable cause might exist, the defendants could thereby escape liability, because of the
injured party's inability to divide his damages between the two with delicate nicety.'" 13 Cal.
3d at 56, 529 P.2d at 618, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (quoting Boogher v. Bryant, 86 Mo. 42, 50
(1885)).
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when, because of the interrelationship of the defense and cross-action, the
injured party could not apportion his damages."30
Conclusion
As involuntary participants in the court system, defendants must be
afforded every means of self-defense. On the other hand, self-defense can
be carried to an extreme; when pursued through a cross-action, that extreme
becomes an offensive action. In Bertero, the California Supreme Court was
faced with a problem that did not lend itself to an easy answer. Predict-
ably, Chief Justice Wright reached a reasonable and equitable result. The
Bertero decision brings to California law a realistic solution to the problem
of a defendant's malicious counter-attack against an honest plaintiff.
30. 13 Cal. 3d at 60, 529 P.2d at 620, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
